Systems Safety, Risk-Taking, and Motorcyclists

[VersysRider]

[ARTICLE]By Bob Maddocks, Colorado Springs

Traditional systems safety, whether in aerospace engineering or motorcycles, is based on the general premise that “risk” (e.g. danger of injury, death or other bad outcomes) can be eliminated or reduced in potential severity by either engineering (design) or operational (procedural) controls. Thus, engineers identify the hazards and failure modes/effects associated with the system, then attempt to design in safety features or mistake proofing to eliminate the hazards. As a last resort, operational controls – sometimes called “administrative controls” – may also be put in place. Specifically in terms of automotive systems, we tend to traditionally rely on engineering the physical features of the human environment, informing people of the dangers, and trying to enforce rules of personal behavior (e.g. traffic laws) to promote safety and health.

Over the last twenty years, this traditional approach to systems safety engineering and operational controls has come under increasing scrutiny and debate. Dr. Gerald J. S. Wilde, a leading authority on risk behavior, believes that all human beings have a target level of risk that they are willing to accept in their everyday l ives and that “interventions” designed to improve safety (engineering, laws, etc.) will consistently fail unless this target level of risk is somehow changed. According to Wilde’s “ R i s k H o m e o s t a s i s T h e o r y , ” people accept a certain level of subjectively estimated risk to their health, safety, and other things they value, in exchange for the benefits they hope to receive from their risky activity (transportation, work, eating, drinking, drug use, recreation, romance, sports or whatever).”

Thus, risk behavior experts like Wilde believe that traditional safety engineering, public safety information, and traffic laws are not very productive towards greater safety and health insofar as they are dependent on human conduct. For example, in an experiment in Germany, drivers of taxis were provided with better ABS brakes to improve braking capability under extreme conditions. The drivers were not aware that their driving behavior was being observed, but knew that they were operating ABS equipped cabs. Later analyses showed that the drivers of cabs with ABS made sharper turns, were less accurate in their lane-holding, followed closer , made more dangerous merging maneuvers, and created more “traffic conflicts” compared to non-ABS cab drivers. In general, the drivers with the ABS -equipped vehicles tended to drive faster and more haphazardly, relying on their brakes more than the non-ABS drivers.

Risk homeostasis theory holds that if a risk is identified in a given system and is reduced by reforming the environment , then human beings will make a compensatory increase in risk-taking somewhere else in the system. Several studies have shown that enforcing speed l imit s on one area may cause accident migration” when drivers merely use an alternative route. If risk homeostasis theory is correct, traditional methods of modifying the overal risk environment (design) may clearly be ineffective. Likewise, we human beings often tend to “consume” the safety that is built into our systems, sometimes to bad effect. An example is the fact that “childproof” containers have failed to eliminate the inadvertent poisoning of children because many parents became complacent, relying more on the built-in safety cap instead of continuing to keep poisons out of reach (e.g. an effective operational control).

What happens when the opposite occurs, when the environment becomes more difficult instead of safer? Many studies show that introducing difficulties actually elicits better overall safety, both in human awareness and behavior. An example happened when Sweden changed to driving on the right, resulting in 17 percent less road fatalities in the first year. In other words, if drivers recognize increased driving hazards and challenges, they tend to change their behavior to keep the overall risk they experience at a fairly constant level. This “risk realization” point is particularly important to those of us who drive motorcycles, and can apply to all types of changes and conditions, including inclement weather, road conditions, operator fatigue, complacency, etc.

As my STAR “buffet racing” competitor Moose Parish asked several years ago, you might simply question, “So what, Dog? What does all this theoretical systems safety stuff from these academic eggheads have to do with riding my VFR or Gold Wing quickly and safely?”

Cogitate upon these morsels of knowledge, Oh Speedy Grasshoppers:

Assuming some truth to the theory of “risk homeostasis,” realize that you have a personal “risk comfort level” that contrib-utes significantly to your behavior-based safety while riding. This is primarily a subconscious (not a cognitive, rationalizing) process. Ensure that your actual level of acceptable risk properly weighs critical external factors, such as weather, fatigue, road conditions and competitive attitude.

Avoid “consuming” the safety features of your equipment. Despite the fact that modern motorcycles are inherently well engineered and reliable, all systems (e.g. ABS, engine controls, electronics, tires) are capable of failure. Fortunately, modern engineering tries to ensure that truly critical systems are at least “two-fault” tolerant, fail non-catastrophically, and are thus sufficiently redundant. Still, ensure that you have a “way out” if something breaks.

Above all, understand that riding quickly and safely is often more mental than physical. Consider the overall environ-ment, weigh the hazards, “what if?” the potential behavioral outcomes, avoid complacency, and give yourself some effective margin. Above all, expect the unexpected.

R. Maddocks

References:
“Target Risk” by Gerald J.S. Wilde, PDE Publications, 1994
“Risk-taking, health and safety,” A Drivers.com Editorial, September 9, 1996

Robert “Dog” Maddocks and wife Mary Jane are MSTA members living in Colorado Springs. Both retired from NASA’s Johnson Space Center in Houston in 2009. “Dog” was formerly the Chief Engineer for Lockheed Martin Space Operations, an SRM&QA Director, and a member of the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE). Mary Jane is a retired Medical Scientist (ASCP) who previously supported NASA-JSC Bone & Mineral research and astronaut training.[/ARTICLE]

[TN2Wheeler]

Strangely I actually understand what Dog said. And, I agree with Wilde. People tend to consume the safety features in modern vehicles by driving faster, following too closely and generally placing others, particularly exposed motorcyclists, to greater danger. The prevailing thinking of engineering safety rather than encouraging behavioral changes simply does not work.

Jim Randall

[HawkGTRider]

While it's not exactly the same, I think this thought process somewhat parallels a study done a few years ago with changing the size of the hole on golf courses. It was enlarged slightly. The end result of that change was that there was very little change to the scoring. People were more aggressive with their putting from longer distances still leaving themselves short shots to finish the hole.